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Rationing Health Care in Canada*
Murray G. Brown**
This article examines how access to health care is managed in
Canada's publicly financed healthcare system. It describes the
evolution of new public sector management strategies designed to
preserve Canada's "free," universal, and comprehensive healthcare
programs during difficult economic times. The central theme is
that dispassionate macro-rationing decisions throughout the
healthcare system indirectly influence micro-rationing decisions at
the clinical level, which in extreme cases involve highly emotive
and value-laden choices about which patients shall, or shall not,
receive vital healthcare services.
CANADA'S HEALTHCARE SYSTEM
Societal Values Regarding Equity and Efficiency
Canada's healthcare system reflects Canadian societal values and
beliefs about the nature of healthcare services, about equity, and
about how best to achieve equitable access to necessary health care.
Societal beliefs include assessments of the relative efficiency and
acceptability of funding and delivering healthcare services through
the public sector, the private sector, or some hybrid system. In
some of these matters, Canadian and United States values, beliefs,
and assessments differ considerably.
Canadians view health care as something to which all Canadians
should have equal access. Canadians are also pragmatic in pursu-
ing public policy, embracing public sector initiatives as well as pub-
lic sector/private sector joint ventures when it is advantageous to
* A version of this article was delivered at the Third Annual Comparative Health
Law Conference, "Rationing Medical Care: A Comparative Review of Legal & Ethical
Issues," sponsored by Loyola University Chicago School of Law Institute for Health Law
in October of 1992.
** Of the Department of Community Health and Epidemiology, Dalhousie Univer-
sity. I am grateful to Vern Hicks, George Kephart, and an anonymous peer reviewer for
their comments and suggestions.
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do so.' The Canada Health Act of 19842 requires that provincial
Medicare programs be "comprehensive, universal, portable, publicly
administered and accessible."3 The 1992 Consensus Report on the
Constitution, The "Charlottetown Agreement," addressed federal-
provincial fiscal equalization objectives by stating that, to promote
equality of access by all Canadians to necessary healthcare serv-
ices, "Parliament and the Government of Canada are committed to
making equalization payments so that provincial governments have
sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public
services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation."4 Underlying
these explicit equity goals regarding access to health care and pub-
lic funding is the imperative to manage scarce public sector re-
sources efficiently.
In order to understand Canada's healthcare system, its evolu-
tion, and the balance of forces that preserve and threaten its con-
tinued viability, one needs to understand something of Canada's
constitutional division of powers and federal-provincial fiscal rela-
tionships. Program cost-sharing by federal and provincial govern-
ments, in one form or another, is the glue that binds the separate
provincial programs into something that can be legitimately de-
scribed as a "national" healthcare system. Through cost-sharing
"carrots and sticks," Canada's federal government has been able to
induce all provincial and territorial governments, which have con-
stitutional responsibility for health under the Constitution Act of
1867,1 to implement basic healthcare programs that are compre-
hensive, universal, portable, publicly administered, and accessible.
1. MALCOLM G. TAYLOR, INSURING NATIONAL HEALTH CARE: THE CANADIAN
EXPERIENCE (1990). While individuals may disagree with some of the specifics of the
Medicare system, such as the nature of healthcare services and the equity of service distri-
bution, the federal health legislation and corresponding provincial and territorial govern-
ment health legislation has been consistent with the five Medicare principles.
2. Canada Health Act of 1984, R.S.C. 1985, c. 6.
3. "Comprehensive" implies entitlement to a broad, but not unlimited, range of re-
quired health services, with no upper limits; "universal" means that provincial plans
cover all legal residents in a province; "portable" means that health insurance coverage
continues without interruption when a person's official residence is transferred from one
province to another or when a resident travels outside the province; "publicly adminis-
tered" is as stated; "accessible" in this context has come to mean that health services
must be "free" at the time of utilization, i.e., there shall be no direct money cost to the
patient.
4. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, CONSENSUS REPORT ON THE CONSTITUTION, THE
"CHARLOTTETOWN AGREEMENT" (Ottawa: Queen's Printer Aug. 28, 1992). The
Charlottetown Agreement failed to pass a national referendum in October, 1992, but for
reasons unrelated to clauses that reaffirmed commitment to the five principles underpin-
ning Canada's health care system.
5. CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867, (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c.3.
[Vol. 2
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Basic Federal/Provincial Health Programs
Canada's basic health programs, often referred to collectively as
"Medicare," cover hospital care, diagnostic services, and medical
care (Figure 1). These are provincial programs jointly funded by
federal and provincial governments.
FIGURE 1: CANADIAN HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS
Basic Health Care Supplementary Health Care
"Canadian Medicare"
Program 9 Hospital care e.g. - Nova Scotia's
e Diagnositc services 0 Children's Dental Plan
0 Medical care 0 Seniors' Pharmacare Plan
Principles * Universality 0 Targeted populations
* Comprehensive coverage 0 Selected coverage
* "Free" access * User copayment > 0
o Publicly administered 0 Publicly administered
o Portability within Canada
Jurisdiction e Health care- 0 Provincial
provincial/federal
9 Medicare plans-Provincial
Similarity * All provinces-very similar 0 Differ across provinces
basic programs
Funding o Provincial $ 0 Provincial $
* Federal equalization $ 0 Federal Equalization $
9 Federal Established Program
funding Medicare $
(Canada Health Act 1984)
At the patient level, "accessible" care means "free" care when
Medicare services are utilized. Patients, as taxpayers, know that
"free" Medicare services are paid for through taxes. At the
federal-provincial level, "accessible" care is fostered by fiscal trans-
fers weighted in favour of poorer provinces. Federal cost-sharing
takes two forms. First, the Canada Health Act and its antecedents
provide for specific federal fiscal transfers to the provinces to sup-
port Medicare programs, contingent upon adherence to the five
Medicare principles. Second, more general federal-provincial
agreements provide for fiscal equalization payments to poorer
provinces to enable them to offer "reasonably comparable levels of
public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation." 6
These equalization transfers augment provincial general revenues
without strings attached, enabling poorer provinces to provide
6. Canada Health Act of 1984, R.S.C. 1985, c. 6.
1993]
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more public services, including Medicare programs, than would
otherwise be possible.
It is misleading to regard Canada's Medicare system as a purely
public sector system. Instead, it is a mixed system characterized
by highly centralized public sector funding and a global manage-
ment system that is combined with a decentralized healthcare de-
livery system. For example, included in the delivery system are
not-for-profit hospitals; Red Cross blood service; other non-
governmental organizations ("NGO"s); private practice fee-for-
service physicians; physicians compensated on other bases; other
health professionals; and private sector firms supplying goods and
services used as inputs in producing hospital, diagnostic, and medi-
cal care services. Provincial governments directly deliver certain
healthcare services such as mental health and long term chronic
care. In addition, both federal and provincial departments of
health provide a broad range of public health and population
health programs that do not deliver direct patient care.
Parallel to Canada's publicly financed/mixed delivery system is
a small but growing private market that complements the publicly
funded system by providing services not covered by Medicare.
Various administrative and economic barriers currently limit the
range of healthcare services that can be offered, or offered profita-
bly, in competition with Medicare programs. Whether Canada's
secondary private market will be permitted to compete across the
full range of Medicare services in the future is a sensitive political
issue. A two-tiered healthcare system is anathema to those
strongly committed to principles of equal access to necessary
healthcare services for all Canadians.
Supplementary Provincial Healthcare Programs
Besides basic federal-provincial Medicare programs, provincial
governments provide supplementary healthcare entitlement pro-
grams. The principles underlying these supplementary health pro-
grams differ from Medicare's five principles. Supplementary
healthcare entitlement programs typically (1) are targeted at par-
ticular groups, (2) cover selective rather than comprehensive bene-
fits, and (3) are "free" but, more frequently, include user
copayment fees. For example, supplementary programs that pro-
vide drug coverage, dental coverage, and specific services of impor-
tance to targeted illness groups differ greatly from province to
province despite similar health needs across Canada. This dispar-
ity in supplementary healthcare programs mirrors the substantial
[Vol. 2
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inter-provincial differences in per capita income and tax revenue
that exist even after substantial federal equalization payments to
the poorer provinces.
Having briefly described Canadian values regarding equitable
access to health care and the basic structure of federal-provincial
Medicare programs and the supplementary provincial health pro-
grams that are the centerpieces of Canada's healthcare system, this
article will next examine the necessity of rationing, in general, and
the rationing mechanisms used in Canada's healthcare system.
RATIONING IN PRINCIPLE
What Is Rationing?
How is it possible to reconcile the equitable principles underly-
ing Canada's Medicare programs-which appear to promise all
Canadians "free" access to unlimited health care-with the need to
ration Canada's limited economic and healthcare resources? Reali-
ties of resource scarcity necessarily temper Medicare's goal of pro-
viding "free" access to comprehensive health care for all
Canadians. Medicare's equitable principles, however, help to guide
the allocation of scarce Medicare resources among competing uses
and users.
Societies ration healthcare resources in ways that reflect their
own societal values, beliefs, institutions, and history. In pure
price-rationing systems, market forces determine who has access to
healthcare services, with rationing determined by the distribution
of purchasing power. Non-price-rationing systems adopt other en-
titlement criteria to determine who has access to available health-
care services while relying on charitable donations or public
taxation to fund healthcare services. Hybrid rationing systems
combine non-price entitlement criteria with user copayment pric-
ing policies.
Decisions that "ration" healthcare resources within a publicly
funded healthcare system, such as Canada's, occur at many levels.
Rationing at the macro (managerial) level is implicit in govern-
ment decisions about the overall size of healthcare budgets and al-
locations to Medicare and competing health programs. Macro-
rationing decisions at each successive level of management set the
stage for micro-level rationing decisions involving individual pa-
tients and healthcare providers.
At the macro level, rationing is performed in the abstract: gov-
ernments allocate scarce resources among competing uses and
1993]
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users. At the micro level, patients and providers are usually una-
ware of the many macro management decisions that indirectly af-
fect patient/provider behaviours and utilization of Medicare
services. Neither patients nor providers show much interest in
macro allocation issues when patient access to non-urgent health-
care services and provider workloads are reasonable. However, in
more dramatic cases, micro rationing at the patient/provider level
involves highly emotive and value-laden decisions about who gets
access to scarce services that may be vitally important to either the
length or quality of the patient's life.
Equity, Effectiveness, and Efficiency in Theory
All Canadians are entitled access to "necessary" Medicare serv-
ices. Medicare's equal access principle includes both a horizontal
and vertical interpretation of equity or fairness. Horizontal equity
implies that persons having comparable health problems and com-
parable prospects of health status improvement if they receive
healthcare services are equally entitled to those services. Vertical
equity implies a priority ranking of persons entitled to healthcare
services, with priority given to persons having greater healthcare
needs for which effective treatment exists.7 Medicare's universal
entitlement principle is interpreted to mean equal access, taking
into account the urgency of healthcare needs, the effectiveness of
treatments available, and the expected yield of health benefits.
This interpretation is expected to guide both macro-level and
micro-level decisions about the allocation of scarce Medicare
resources.
To maximize the improvements of Canadians' health, evidence
of the comparative clinical effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and effi-
ciency of the healthcare system is essential. To maximize program
and clinical benefits, Medicare managers and clinical care provid-
ers need information on the relationship between healthcare service
utilization and health outcomes, as measured by change in health
status. In principle, only "medically necessary" healthcare serv-
ices of proven effectiveness are covered under Canada's Medicare
programs.8
Under ideal conditions, public sector health resources would be
7. The ranking of health services needs, from both equity and efficiency perspectives,
should take into account the net present value of health benefits expected in present and
future time periods from the full spectrum of demonstrably effective health care services,
i.e., diagnostic, curative, management, rehabilitation, palliative care, prevention services,
and health promotion services.
8. This determination is a source of contention. See Margaret A. Shone, Health, Pov-
[Vol. 2
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allocated among competing health programs and services so that
incremental health benefits would be the same for the last dollar
spent on each program and service. If such conditions were at-
tained, it would be impossible to increase further the total health
benefits by reallocating resources from one health program or serv-
ice to another. Applying similar efficiency criteria to all public sec-
tor programs, available public sector resources would be optimally
allocated when, at the margin, the perceived value of health pro-
gram benefits per dollar spent are similar to those of all other pub-
lic sector programs, such as education, justice, or defense. The
optimal size of the public sector versus the private sector is
achieved in principle when the expected gain from public sector
programs financed by a marginal tax dollar is equal to the expected
loss of benefits from private sector consumption foregone.
Before turning from the discussion of rationing under ideal con-
ditions to rationing in practice, it is important to note that the
universality and equity principles that guide Canadian Medicare
and other public sector health programs serve to clarify the objec-
tives of health resource managers. The principle of "equal access
to all" directs both macro-level and micro-level managers of public
sector health resources to focus on health outcomes, independent
of socioeconomic or other characteristics of individual Canadians
eligible to receive healthcare services.
RATIONING IN PRACTICE
The gulf between how scarce healthcare resources should be al-
located in theory and what is possible in practice is considerable.
Efficient managerial decision making at both macro and micro
levels is severely limited by the extent to which relevant data is
unavailable, incomplete, or imperfect. Even when valid and relia-
ble data exists, its value as an indicator of the most fundamental of
relationships between health service inputs and health outcomes is
uncertain. The current state of scientific knowledge about the
comparative clinical effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and program
effectiveness of alternative interventions for various acute and
chronic states of ill health and various health promotion and pre-
vention programs is incomplete at best. This reflects substantive
difficulties in measuring functional relationships between health-
care services and health outcomes for many types of health services
and health problems. Even when clinical effectiveness is carefully
erty and the Elderly: Can the Courts Make a Difference?, 29 ALTA. L. REV. 839 (1991)
(noting uncovered medical needs of the elderly and poor).
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measured and positive health benefits are demonstrated statisti-
cally, the results for individual patients are often uncertain, encom-
passing a wide range of health outcomes. Given such uncertainty
at the clinical level, there is increasing recognition that it is neces-
sary for the clinician, acting as the patient's agent, to take patient
values into account when making clinical decisions in order to
achieve appropriate utilization of health services. 9
Triage Rationing
In practice, non-price rationing within Canada's public sector
health programs is based on a form of "triage:" 10 when health re-
sources are inadequate to meet all demands for health services, re-
sources are explicitly or implicitly ranked and rationed by the
degree of "need" for effective health care. "Need" is a slippery
concept, of course."1 If an extremely broad definition of "health"
is adopted, for example a definition incorporating physical, psycho-
logical, social, and spiritual dimensions, then almost any health
service, including placebos and purely compassionate care, may
contribute to better health. But even if one accepts in principle a
broad definition of "health," there are enough genuine problems of
ill health in the population, together with opportunities to provide
demonstrably effective acute care, illness prevention, and health
promotion services, that health program managers may focus on
health "needs" nearer to the "important" end rather than the
"trivial" end of the health program "needs" spectrum. By consid-
ering both the importance of particular health problems and the
effectiveness of available prevention and treatment strategies for
particular health problems, healthcare services and programs may
be ranked roughly in terms of their expected health outcomes and
cost-effectiveness. Available data on the costs and benefits of alter-
native health enhancement strategies, despite its flaws and incom-
pleteness, is used implicitly or explicitly to allocate (ration)
available healthcare resources following triage principles.
The amount of health care to provide for purely compassionate
and humanitarian reasons cannot be resolved by reference to scien-
tific evidence of clinical effectiveness or economic efficiency. Once
9. Relevant patient preferences and values include attitudes toward risk avoidance,
time trade-offs, and the patient's expected treatment results.
10. Triage [Fr. "sorting"] the sorting and classification of casualties of war or other
disaster, to determine priority of need and proper place of treatment. DORLANDS ILLUS-
TRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (25th ed. 1974).
11. Alan Williams, Need-An Economic Exegesis, in ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF
HEALTH SERVICES (A.J. Culyer & K.G. Wright eds., Oxford: Martin Robinson 1978).
[Vol. 2
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again, societal values emerge as the ultimate reference point in get-
ting the right balance of public sector healthcare resources allo-
cated for improved health outcomes versus those allocated for
purely compassionate care. For example, how much palliative care
or care for persons with incurable mental or physical handicaps
should be given?
Public Administration as a Cost Containment Strategy
Canada adopted a publicly funded and administered Medicare
system because it was, and is, perceived to be a more effective, effi-
cient, and equitable organizational structure for achieving Can-
ada's healthcare goals than alternative systems characterized by
less centralized control. Evidence comparing the evolution of the
healthcare systems in Canada and United States over the past three
decades indicates, at least to Canadian observers, that Canada's
more centralized system of health policy formulation, universal
coverage, tax-based funding, and program management at the
macro level combined with a decentralized healthcare delivery sys-
tem in which arms length not-for-profit institutions and independ-
ent private physicians manage the delivery of healthcare programs
at the micro level has important economic advantages in managing
healthcare resources. Whether future historians will agree that the
organizational structure of Canada's Medicare system is compara-
tively effective and efficient is an open question.
Canada's public sector management of basic healthcare pro-
grams derives substantial cost savings in five ways: (1) avoidance
of health insurance marketing costs, which are a significant portion
of costs incurred by private healthcare insurance companies, (2)
avoidance of private insurance company costs of screening "high
risk" applicants, (3) very low costs for central administration and
claims processing for Canada's medical care and pharmacare pro-
grams (about three percent of total program costs), (4) mecha-
nisms for centrally managing the capacity and total cost of the
healthcare delivery system in ways unavailable to private sector in-
surers, and (5) avoidance of the substantial accounting, billing, and
collection costs incurred in price-rationing systems, which provide
each patient with an itemized invoice for all medical care utilized.
These are the more obvious direct cost savings associated with a
non-price-rationing system.1 2
12. Robert G. Evans, et al., Controlling Health Expenditures-The Canadian Reality,
320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 571-77 (Mar. 2, 1989).
1993]
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From "Open-Ended" Expenditures to "Managed Growth"
Canada's publicly financed healthcare entitlement programs
have evolved over recent decades from programs characterized by
"open-ended" access and costs to programs characterized by
"managed growth" of both capacity and costs. This evolution re-
flects the need to develop public policy and management mecha-
nisms to reconcile expenditures on healthcare entitlement
programs, which programs appear to promise open-ended access to
health care with the economic realities of limited resources avail-
able for such programs.
Strategies designed to limit Medicare program expenditures to
acceptable rates of growth consistent with their respective fiscal ca-
pacities were initiated by the federal government and all ten pro-
vincial governments. Because health care is within provincial
jurisdiction, the federal government is limited to offering fiscal
cost-sharing carrots and sticks. The provinces, as managers of the
Medicare programs mandated by provincial legislatures, have a
broader range of program management tools available to them.
These tools include (1) redefinition of program entitlements, (2)
health sector capacity management, and (3) financial management
strategies. Because provincial management options are fewer for
Medicare programs governed by the Canada Health Act of 1984
than they are for provincial supplementary health programs, it is
instructive to compare the managed growth strategies applied to
these two classes of healthcare programs.
Federal Managed Growth Strategies
The Canadian government offered large financial incentives to
induce the provinces to establish Medicare programs that adhere to
Medicare's five principles through legislation such as the Hospital
Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act of 1957,13 and the Medical
Care Insurance Act of 1966.14 The federal government initially of-
fered to share about one half of Medicare costs, paying a higher
portion of costs in poorer provinces. In the 1970s, the federal gov-
ernment insisted on new cost-sharing arrangements that limited to-
tal federal fiscal liability for Medicare costs by linking growth of
federal contributions to growth in population and gross national
product. 5 Since then, federal cost-sharing has continued to fall
13. Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act, S.C. 1957, c. 28.
14. Medical Care Insurance Act, S.C. 1966-67, c. 64.
15. Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and Established Programs Financing
Act, S.C. 1976-77, c. 10.
[Vol. 2
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given low real economic growth, the worst economic recession
since the 1930s, and a large and growing national debt. Federal
government-established Program Financing Contributions/trans-
fers to provinces were frozen and are now falling; they no longer
grow with the economy as a whole and the amount of cash trans-
ferred in tax credits is falling even further.
The replacement of open-ended federal cost sharing agreements
with formulae that have progressively limited total federal fiscal
liability for Medicare, in both real and proportional terms, has in-
creased provincial incentives to contain Medicare costs, as in-
tended. 6 However, by progressively reducing federal cost-sharing
of Medicare programs, the threat of the termination of such fund-
ing is greatly reduced, thereby weakening the federal government's
capacity to induce all provinces to continue to provide basic
healthcare programs that conform to Medicare's five principles.
Provincial Managed Growth Strategies: Medicare Programs
Provincial strategies to manage the growth of Medicare program
expenditures include modification of program entitlements, man-
agement of the size of the province's healthcare system, and finan-
cial management.
Program Entitlements
Provincial government initiatives to modify or reinterpret funda-
mental Medicare principles are limited by the federal/provincial
cost-sharing agreements included in the Canada Health Act of
1984 and its subsequent revisions. No province has challenged
Medicare's principles of universality, public administration, and
portability. What constitutes comprehensive coverage, however, is
open to various interpretations and revisions. This is not surpris-
ing given the difficulties noted earlier in defining "necessary" medi-
cal care, for whom, when, and where. As fiscal conditions have
16. The Established Program Financing Act ("EPF") removed the distorting effect of
"50 cent Medicare dollars," whereby provincial healthcare managers bore only approxi-
mately 50% of program cost increases under the initial federal/provincial cost-sharing
formula. By moving to a system whereby provincial treasuries bear the full cost of margi-
nal increases in Medicare program costs, apart from specific cost increases borne by the
federal government under the EPF cost-sharing formula, the incentive to contain costs
increases.
Provinces considering the introduction of selective user copayment fees as a cost-
containment strategy are discouraged from such experimentation. The Canada Health
Act of 1984 requires the federal government to deduct $1 of Medicare payments made to
a province for every $1 in Medicare copayment fees collected in that province, either by
physicians or by the provincial government.
1993]
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deteriorated, provincial Medicare program managers have dein-
sured certain healthcare services. 17
In principle, criteria for determining which healthcare services
to insure or deinsure should be based on valid and reliable evidence
of comparative clinical cost-effectiveness. In reality, such evidence
for the thousands of hospital, diagnostic, and medical care services
covered by Medicare programs is scarce, uncertain, incomplete,
and frequently inconclusive. Hence, even well-informed evalua-
tions of which services are least cost-effective and hence prime can-
didates for deinsurance are subject to challenge. However, the
need to revisit the question of what constitutes "comprehensive"
Medicare coverage illustrates that the definition of what is "neces-
sary" health care is a function of changing fiscal constraints as well
as of expected health benefits and costs.
Periodic reexamination of what constitutes "necessary" medical
care is appropriate considering the optimization criteria discussed
earlier in the section entitled "Equity, Effectiveness, and Efficiency
in Theory." The boundaries between "necessary" and "unneces-
sary" healthcare services are not fixed in stone, but rather will ex-
pand or contract as conditions change. For example, when
Medicare resources were expanding in the 1960s and 1970s, Medi-
care coverage expanded to incorporate new services and cost-
effective medical technologies without displacing other healthcare
coverage. The negligible growth in real income per capita since the
1970s has curbed the rate of growth of Medicare resources. Under
such conditions, it appears appropriate to deinsure those health-
care services judged to have low marginal contribution to im-
proved health outcomes in order to redirect scarce funds to other
existing or new health services judged to be more cost-effective.
Canada's federal government has not challenged the recent dein-
surance of selected healthcare services by various provinces. This
may be because the deinsured services constituted such a small
part of total Medicare coverage. However, if provincial economies
continue to deteriorate, the question of what healthcare services
are in fact "necessary" is certain to recur. In a world of continuing
and rapid change, program optimality boundaries also undergo
continuing change.
17. For example, Nova Scotia's Medicare benefits cover a routine annual eye exami-
nation every 24 months, rather than every 12 months, effective 1992. In cases where more
frequent eye examinations are deemed medically necessary, however, Medicare continues
to cover all such examinations.
[Vol. 2
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Capacity Management Strategies
In publicly funded healthcare systems such as Canada's, where a
consumer price system is not used to determine the overall size of
the system, management of the system's capacity to produce
healthcare services and management of the cost of inputs is tanta-
mount to management of total healthcare costs. Say's Law, which
posits that "supply creates its own demand,"18 drives total health-
care system costs when needs are ill-defined, the effectiveness of
alternative treatments is difficult to measure, evidence of compara-
tive cost-effectiveness is scarce, and the propensity to utilize serv-
ices is governed by the degree of convenience to patients tempered
by micro-rationing decisions of healthcare providers. In such sys-
tems, the increased capacity to provide healthcare services results
in increased utilization at both the extensive and intensive bounda-
ries of healthcare needs.
Canadian provinces manage the capacity of their healthcare sys-
tems in much the same way as would managers of a prepaid Health
Maintenance Organization ("HMO"). Of course, provinces have
more tools to manage capacity than their private sector counter-
parts. Provinces also have public health goals that are served by
the full spectrum of health programs, from acute care through
health promotion, and are facilitated by the contribution to health
of many other public programs besides those housed in health de-
partments. The examples of capacity management provided below
will be restricted to hospital-based services and to physician serv-
ices, which together account for about eighty percent of provincial
healthcare service expenditures.
Hospital Capacity
The capacity of the hospital sector is directly or indirectly con-
trolled by provincial governments. Capacity management includes
the number and location of provincial not-for-profit hospitals, the
number of beds, the role of the hospital (e.g., acute or chronic care;
local, regional, or tertiary care; inpatient or outpatient services;
range of diagnostic services), and the amounts of capital equipment
and staffing. Hospital operating budgets depend almost entirely
upon provincial government grants, which reflect the hospital's
provincially defined role. Capital budgets to expand or update hos-
18. The French economist Jean-Baptiste Say (1767-1832) developed his theory in a
different context; however, observers of healthcare systems have long recognized connec-
tions between growth in capacity and growth in utilization at both macro and micro
levels.
19931
13
Br wn: Rationing Health Care i  Canad
Published by LAW eCommons, 1993
Annals of Health Law
pital capacity are dominated by provincial contributions but do in-
clude funds raised in communities. However, the provinces'
control is not absolute. Provinces no longer cover hospital operat-
ing deficits as they once did. In addition, while the range of serv-
ices offered by hospitals is constrained by their role and their global
budgets, the way in which healthcare services are to be delivered is
determined by the hospital board, its administrators, and its pro-
fessional staff.
Another technique used by provinces to control capacity in-
volves hospital-based physicians. Few hospital-based physicians
are hospital employees. Almost all are independent fee-for-service
practitioners who seek hospital appointments in order to use cer-
tain hospital facilities and services when serving their patients.
These appointments require them to perform some unpaid func-
tions within the hospitals. As part of their capacity management
strategy, some provinces are taking increasing interest in whether
new medical staff appointments, particularly specialist appoint-
ments, are consistent with a hospital's role and budget.
Physician Supply
The growth in the utilization of physician services in Canada is
closely linked to the growth in the number of physicians. The ca-
pacity of Canadian medical schools was increased by fifty percent
in the 1960s, when provincial Medical Care Insurance programs
were introduced. In retrospect, not all of this increased capacity
was needed, as Canada's population increased less rapidly than an-
ticipated and immigration of foreign trained physicians increased
more rapidly than anticipated. Consequently, the number of phy-
sicians per capita has more than doubled over the past twenty-five
years, despite restrictions placed on the immigration of foreign-
trained physicians in 1974. Federal/provincial ministers of health
first publicly acknowledged an excess supply, or at least an exces-
sive rate of growth, of physicians in Canada in 1992. The rate of
growth of the number in physicians in Canada is being cut ten per-
cent by reducing enrollments in Canadian medical schools effective
1993 and by a similar reduction in the immigration and licensing of
foreign trained physicians.19
19. British Columbia's attempt to limit physician numbers, by restricting a physi-
cian's choice of practice location, was struck down as a breach of the physician's Charter
Rights in Wilson v. Medical Services Commission of British Columbia, 2 W.W.R. 1
(B.C.C.A. 1989), leave to appeal refused.
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Financial Management Strategies
Managed growth strategies for public sector programs funded by
global budgets, such as hospital services, have not had to be partic-
ularly innovative. As fiscal conditions have deteriorated, the
growth of Medicare program budget allocations has been reduced,
eliminated, or cut in terms of real purchasing power. Operating
deficits are no longer sanctioned retrospectively, as in more pros-
perous times.
More innovative management initiatives have been required to
manage the rate of growth in expenditures on "open-ended" health
programs, where expenditures are driven by utilization of services
provided by private practitioners. Cost containment strategies
have focused on Medical Care Insurance programs, which are the
largest of the "open-ended" programs. Bilateral fee schedule nego-
tiations between the provinces and provincial medical associations
moderated the escalation of medical fees, relative to United States
medical fees, during the 1970s and 1980s, but did not control or
fully offset growth in expenditures due to increases in the volume
of billings for insured services per physician (and per patient) and
increases in the number of physicians per capita. In the past de-
cade, all provinces have attempted, in different ways, to modify
their open-ended medical care programs so that they are con-
strained by a global cap or ceiling on expenditures, similar to that
of most other public sector programs. Typically, if a global expen-
diture cap will be exceeded, fees paid to providers of insured serv-
ices are reduced just enough to assure that expenditures do not
exceed the global cap.
Global capping puts considerable stress on medical associations
as their membership adjusts to this new zero-sum-game environ-
ment. The result is a renewed interest in tackling perceived fee
schedule inequities and large differences in inter-specialty earnings.
Some provinces have introduced caps on individual gross earnings
within selected specialty groups. One positive result of these global
capping initiatives is the evolution of joint management commit-
tees comprised of provincial health department and medical associ-
ation representatives. These committees are formed in recognition
of the fact that cost-effective delivery of medical care services
within a regime of global expenditure caps calls for new joint man-
agement strategies. The mandates of these joint management com-
mittees extend far beyond annual fee schedule negotiations to
include issues such as medical manpower planning, licensure, qual-
ity assurance, and public accountability.
1993]
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Provincial Managed Growth Strategies: Supplementary
Healthcare Programs
Provincial supplementary health programs, in contrast to Medi-
care programs, are characterized by (1) targeted population cover-
age, (2) selective healthcare coverage, and (3) user copayment fees.
Like Medicare, supplementary healthcare programs are publicly
funded and administered, but services are typically delivered by
nongovernmental entities and private practitioners. Eligibility for
particular programs is restricted to residents of the province.
Provinces enjoy much greater freedom when developing man-
aged growth policies for healthcare programs supplementary to
federal/provincial Medicare programs. These supplementary pro-
grams are created by the legislatures of each province and are fi-
nanced entirely from provincial revenues. Thus, they differ greatly
from province to province. Such programs are therefore subject to
modification in all respects as the financial circumstances of each
province change.
Examples of changes in supplementary health program entitle-
ments in Nova Scotia are: (1) the targeted population entitled to
Children's Dental Plan benefits was reduced from children up to
age 16 to children age 12, (2) the benefits covered under the Chil-
dren's Dental Plan and the Seniors' Pharmacare Plan were re-
duced, and (3) user copayment fees were increased for the Seniors'
Pharmacare Plan and for a subsidized ambulance transportation
program. Similar examples may be drawn from other provinces.
When provinces are free to do so, as with their supplementary
health programs, they adopt both price and nonprice cost contain-
ment strategies.
Difficult Choices
Difficult choices as to who will have access to available health-
care services are inevitable, given the scarcity of resources relative
to healthcare needs. Enlarging or contracting the healthcare sector
simply shifts the boundary conditions where these choices arise.
Societies are reluctant to acknowledge that difficult and sometimes
"tragic choices" must be made and may mask how such choices
are made.20 When possible, governments avoid formulating ex-
plicit rules governing these choices.
In matters of medical care, where dramatic choices of life and
death are involved, the choice of criteria for deciding who will get
20. GuIDO CALABRESI & PHILLIP BOBBITr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
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access to care that is in critically short supply has traditionally
been left to the providers of health care. Given the principles of
universal and equal entitlement to Medicare services, this leaves
Canadian physicians free to rank all patients using criteria of ex-
pected health outcomes.2 If macro-level managers of publicly
funded health programs conclude that rationing criteria other than
expected health outcomes should be used, they must explicitly
state such criteria.
SUMMARY
Canada's experience with its universal, comprehensive, and ac-
cessible ("free") publicly financed healthcare system has been com-
paratively successful over the past several decades in achieving its
stated health system objectives while constraining the growth of
health system costs. The following observations are drawn from
this experience.
The comparative success of Canada's Medicare programs is due
in large part to the structure of Canada's healthcare system, which
is comprised of a fortuitous combination of centralized tax-based
federal/provincial funding; decentralized macro-level management
of ten provincial Medicare programs, as required by Canada's con-
stitutional division of powers; and decentralized micro-level man-
agement of the delivery of healthcare services through contracts
with various nongovernmental organizations, private practitioners,
and private sector firms that operate at arms length from govern-
ment. The cost savings associated with public sector funding and
management of this universal, comprehensive, and accessible
healthcare services system have been substantial.
Recent stresses within Canada's healthcare system are largely
fiscal in origin. Slow real economic growth compounded by a se-
vere economic recession, the cost of servicing a growing public
debt, and the rapid expansion of expensive technology and treat-
ments have forced both federal and provincial governments to
make politically difficult decisions designed to reduce the rate of
growth of public programs in general and of health programs in
particular. Once the economy recovers, Canada's health sector
will undoubtedly continue to grow in absolute terms. However, if
government managed growth objectives are achieved, the health
sector will not grow as a percentage of public sector expenditures
or the Gross National Product.
21. This inherently creates a tension for the physician between his or her role as
patient advocate and his or her role as gatekeeper.
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Problems inherent in (1) evaluating changes in the health status
of both individuals and populations, (2) measuring the effectiveness
of health care, diagnostic, disease prevention, and health promo-
tion services, and (3) measuring the relative value of health im-
provements of individuals suffering from different types of health
problems exist and will persist given the difficult nature of such
measurements. In the absence of valid, reliable, and complete sci-
entific data on the clinical effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and
comparative worth of all insured healthcare services and other
health programs, it is impossible to compare the efficiency of Can-
ada's (or any other) healthcare system with an established "gold
standard." Consequently, even well-informed observers may dis-
agree about the comparative advantages of Canada's healthcare
system and whether available resources are appropriately managed
at the macro and micro levels.
Canadians are strongly supportive of their healthcare system.
They take satisfaction in the egalitarian objectives and achieve-
ments of Medicare and other publicly financed health programs
and they appreciate entitlement to basic healthcare services
through a public sector system that pools risks and costs among all
Canadians. Access to basic healthcare services is generally re-
garded as satisfactory.
Rationing of health resources occurs indirectly through the pub-
lic sector budgeting decisions at the macro level and through deci-
sions of clinical service providers at the micro level. In principle,
clinical care providers and other micro level managers in Canada's
publicly financed healthcare system try to ration patient care at the
margin using "triage" principles based on expected health out-
comes. Macro-level managers try to ration available health re-
sources among competing health programs so as to maximize
benefits to Canadians collectively.22
Budgetary decisions by Canadian politicians and other macro-
level managers implicitly take into account available scientific data
on the health benefits and costs of insured healthcare services.
These macro resource allocation decisions include implicit norma-
tive judgements concerning the (largely unmeasured) relative
worth to Canadians of these publicly financed healthcare services
22. In practice, macro-level and micro-level decisions about resource reallocation
may stray substantially from the principles described. For details on how decisions were
made regarding the assessment and founding of new health technology in one province,
see Adam L. Linton, Organized Medicine and the Assessment of Technology Lessons from
Ontario, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1463-67 (Nov. 22, 1990).
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and programs. However, difficult choices inevitably arise in all
health systems, given resource scarcity. The specific boundaries
where tragic choices manifest themselves will shift following the
expansion or contraction of the healthcare sector, or following the
reallocation of resources among competing health programs.
Nonetheless, the difficult and sometimes tragic choices cannot be
avoided.
Appreciation of Canada's societal values, institutional frame-
work, and social history helps to explain current widespread sup-
port for Canada's publicly financed healthcare system, which is
based on principles of universality, comprehensiveness, accessibil-
ity, public financing and public administration. Such an apprecia-
tion also suggests that Canada's healthcare system is unlikely to be
suitable in toto for any other country because it reflects specific
Canadian values, institutions, and history of healthcare services fi-
nancing and delivery.
How best to ration health resources in any country raises ques-
tions that cannot be resolved by examining only scientific evidence
on the relationship between healthcare service inputs and health
outcomes. Consideration must also be given to normative issues
concerning how (and whose) relative values are assigned to differ-
ent health outcomes, to equity issues about who should be entitled
to access various types of healthcare services, to funding issues
about how best to fund various types of healthcare services and
how to spread the financial risks of catastrophic illness, and to in-
dustrial organizational issues about how to efficiently integrate
public sector and private sector roles in order to achieve a coun-
try's health policy objectives.
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